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3Abstract
A theory that the economic benefits of volunteering are contingent on social class (as 
defined by similarities in labour market situation) is tested using seven waves of longitudinal 
data from the British Household Panel Study gathered between 1996 and 2008 and fixed-effects 
models. Volunteering has a positive effect on earnings, but it is confined to people in 
professional and managerial occupations. Employees in white and blue collar jobs do not benefit. 
The study suggests that inconsistent results from previous studies might be due to failure to 
consider occupational heterogeneity among volunteers. 
Keywords Volunteering, Earnings, Social Class.
The Economic Benefits of Volunteering and Social Class
Lately, the fact that volunteers, deemed as giving away their time and energy, get 
rewards in the form of higher wages has attracted considerable academic and popular attention.  
Although the results of two decades of research on this topic are somewhat mixed, the weight of 
the evidence is that volunteers do indeed earn more money. However, not all volunteers, it 
seems, enjoy these benefits to the same degree. For example, they are conditioned by gender and 
work experience. The examination of moderation effects is one way the science in a field 
advances. It enables us to move beyond blanket generalizations and to narrow down possibilities 
thus helping us expose the mechanisms that account for a relationship. The study reported here 
takes up this challenge by testing a hypothesis that the benefits of volunteering accrue 
disproportionately to workers in occupations that allow them to invest the capital they have 
gained from volunteer work. 
A hypothesis that the benefits of volunteering are dependent on social class position calls 
for a definition of social class. We will argue that the most helpful theory of social class is one in 
4which occupations (not persons) are ordered depending on the nature of the “contract” between 
employer and employee. The labor market is not an atomized and anonymous bargaining center 
in which employers and employees meet. It is a complicated social structure consisting rules 
governing the distribution of earnings and other economic rewards. Workers employed in certain 
occupational groups operate according to one set of rules for determining pay while others 
operate according to another. Our contention is that the class in which the volunteer is located 
helps determine the value of any assets or resources volunteer work might have created. 
In what follows we will first discuss the theory as to why volunteer work “pays off” in 
terms of higher wages. Drawing on the literature on volunteering and its consequences we 
identify three mechanisms to explain the relationship. The next section lays out the argument as 
to why these mechanisms would be more efficacious for some employees than others. This 
argument requires us to identify groups of occupations and we do so by drawing on a well-
known theory of occupational stratification in which classes are defined by employment status 
(employer, self-employed, employee) and, among employees, by the nature of the employment 
contract. This restriction is important to bear in mind: we are interested in the moderation of the 
relation between volunteering and income among those who have an employment contract, 
among employees. Whether or not the effect of volunteering is moderated by other class 
positions as defined by Goldthorpe is beyond the scope of this study. 
Mechanisms Linking Volunteer Work and Earnings
There is consensus among social scientists working this area that there are “[t]hree channels 
through which volunteering may affect earnings” (Bruno and Fiorello 2016: 4). The first is the 
acquisition of skills and work-related experience; the second is the extension of social networks; 
and the third is ability signaling (Baert and Vujic 2016; Day and Devlin 1998; Hackl et al. 2007; 
Qvist and Munk 2017; Shantz et al. 2018). 
The first channel is suggested by human capital theory, according to which disparities in 
earnings are believed to be caused by differences in cognitive ability (e.g. educational 
qualifications) and job skills (e.g. work experience). Previous attempts to test this theory have 
focused on the role of formal types of human capital, such as education (Coleman, 1988), but the 
5term human capital is easily extended to include informal learning channels such as volunteer 
work. Through their volunteer work, people learn hard skills, such as business management, 
carpentry, or software usage, as well as soft skills such as client relations, good communication 
and teamwork (Kamerade, 2015).  
Evidence for the existence of this mechanism is persuasive. It is quite common for people to 
say that volunteering has taught them valuable job skills and that their career has benefitted as a 
result (Chum et al., 2015: 4; Hall et al., 1998; Hodgkinson and Weitzman, 1996; Low et al., 
2007: 34).  In some instances, volunteering might be the only way the skills necessary to get a 
raise in pay or move to a higher paying job are obtainable (Taylor, 2004: 37). When working 
unpaid in an organization, volunteers are effectively auditioning for a role, getting the chance to 
demonstrate their reliability and trustworthiness to prospective employers (Smith, 2010: 291). 
The second channel, social network expansion, is suggested by social capital theory 
according to which well-paying jobs are partially due to having useful social connections. 
Workers who can mobilize the right kind of personal contacts and obtain the most useful job 
information from them are at an advantage, whether this means moving to a better paying job or 
obtaining an increase in pay from an existing employer (Burt, 2000; De Graaf and Flap, 1988). 
Research supports the notion that volunteering expands social networks. Volunteers tend to 
have more social capital than non-volunteers: they have more ties to people in occupations and 
work organizations other than their own, they belong to more voluntary associations, and they 
have more diverse social networks (Alexander et al., 2012; Bekkers et al., 2007; Benton, 2016; 
Van Ingen and Kalmijn, 2010; Isham et al., 2006; Paik and Navarre-Jackson, 2011). 
The third channel is ability signaling. Employers often depend on “signals” of an 
employees’ worth when determining pay because direct and objective measures, such as those 
that might indicate motivation, reliability, honesty or commitment are absent (Spence, 1973).  It 
is widely believed that volunteer activities signal abilities (Baert and Vujic, 2016; Bruno and 
Fiorello, 2016; Collins and Long, 2015; Guttman and Goette, 2015; Katz and Rosenberg, 2005; 
Qvist and Munk, 2017; Taylor, 2005). It is also conceivable, of course, that engaging in 
volunteer work is interpreted by employers as a distraction from the job or lack of commitment 
6to one’s job or career (Hackl et al., 2007). In this case there would be a negative relation between 
volunteering and income.
Most of the evidence from studies in this area shows that employees look favorably on 
volunteers.  LinkedIn, a popular professional networking site based in the United States with 
members in over 135 countries, recently added a field for members to list their volunteer 
activities in their profiles. A survey sponsored by the organization had discovered that forty-one 
percent of employers rated volunteer work as equal in importance to paid work when selecting 
new employees. One in five had based a recent hiring decision on the candidate’s volunteer work 
[http://press.linkedin.com/node/870]. In a recent field experiment, pairs of fictitious applications 
for real job vacancies that were identical except for the inclusion of volunteer work on one of the 
pair were sent to prospective employers. The applicants with volunteer work in their profile had 
a thirty-three per cent higher probability of being invited for a job interview (Baert and Vujic, 
2016). In a 2009 survey in the United Kingdom over seventy percent of employers said that 
employees who volunteer have a better chance of getting an increase in salary and gaining 
promotion [www.timebank.org.uk/key-facts]. Some of these studies are about hiring decisions 
but there is no reason to think that volunteering is of less value when it comes to allocating 
economic rewards such as bonuses and raises in pay. One can expect that reduced interview rates 
translate into reduced job and wage offers (Baert and Vujic, 2016). 
In summary, the “channels” or mechanisms linking volunteering to earnings have been 
conceptualized as the acquisition of the very assets that research into income determination has 
shown be useful in obtaining higher earnings. Human capital draws attention to differences in 
job-related skills; social capital focuses on weak (or bridging) ties to relative strangers who 
might know about jobs that pay better; ability signaling captures the more symbolic connection 
between volunteering and earnings by highlighting the way in which employers interpret 
activities listed on a resume favorably. However, these assets do not have the same value for all 
workers and the following section explains why. 
Moderation by Social Class
To test a theory that the benefits of volunteering are conditioned by social class it is 
necessary to choose a conceptual scheme to differentiate one occupational group from another. 
7In this study we use a classification schema developed by John Goldthorpe and his collaborators.  
The schema is “arguably the most influential occupation-based social classification in 
sociology” (Connelly et al., 2016: 4) and has been “widely used” in the sociology of work as an 
explanatory variable (Williams, 2014: 154). Its origins and development can be followed in 
Eriksen et al. (1979), Goldthorpe (1980), and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). For a comparison 
of this schema with other occupation-based schemas see Lambert and Bihagen, (2014).
Despite changes in terminology over the years the central idea of the scheme, that the 
employment relationship is central to the differentiation of classes, has remained constant 
(Marshall et al. 2001:24). The initial level of differentiation is between employers, the self-
employed (or proprietors), and employees. A further differentiation among employees (who 
make up the large majority of the active working population) is based on how the employment 
relation is regulated. Class position within employees is determined by whether employment is 
regulated via a “labour contract” or a “service relationship” (Marshall et al. 2001; Goldthorpe, 
2010: 316). This is the distinction we highlight in our analysis.
Those whose employment is governed by a labour contract are predominantly working class 
wage earners in routinized manual occupations. They are governed by piece-work or time-rate 
payments systems, rely heavily on over-time or shift-work for increases in take-home pay, and 
are more exposed to loss of pay through sickness, accidents, or unemployment (Goldthorpe, 
2010: 323). Work is precisely measured and controlled, often by machines, as in assembly-line 
work, typically entailing physical rather than symbolic activity. The underlying logic is that pay 
will vary according to the amount of work done. In contrast, the work performed in service 
occupations is more difficult to define precisely and monitor closely. Earnings are only loosely 
tied to productivity. Instead, salary is expected to increase in level over time “conditional upon 
satisfactory appraisal of a relatively long-term kind” (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004: 15). Trust 
between employer and employee is important, involving longer-term and more diffuse 
exchanges (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992:42). Those who have a service relationship with their 
employers consist chiefly of professional, administrative and managerial employees. [Over time 
the term “salariat” has replaced “service relationship” as the name for this category to avoid 
confusion with jobs in the service industry such as waitressing.]
8Why choose Goldthorpe’s schema to test the hypothesis that occupational group moderates 
the influence of volunteering on earnings? Because it divides employees into groups based not 
on occupational prestige, socio-economic status, the nature of the tasks performed, or ownership 
of property but on the manner in which earnings are determined. It is this feature that governs 
whether assets provided by volunteering are deployable in the labor market. Because of the way 
their pay is determined, employees in salariat jobs have the potential to exercise more control 
over the labour process, not least how much they get paid. For example, a reputation for 
community service – ability signaling - can make little difference to the pay of an assembly-line 
worker or a waitress because their earnings are tightly regulated by national agreements or 
closely related to productivity. Even if volunteer work does provide human or social capital it is 
unlikely to have much influence over the pay of employees in these situations. The same assets, 
however, could be more productive in the case of occupations such as that of a sales manager in 
a large retail store (a member of the salariat) where soft skills can be deployed, social ties in the 
community would be more important for the successful promotion of one’s business, and ability 
signals can be interpreted by superiors. 
In summary, volunteer work creates assets of various kinds but the value of these assets 
depends on the class position of the employee. Higher class volunteers who “invest” in volunteer 
work stand to benefit more than lower class volunteers. This moderation theory has not been 
articulated or tested before, as the following literature review will demonstrate.
Literature Review
To date, sixteen studies of the relation between volunteering and earnings have been 
published. They vary widely in the data they use, their analytical strategy, measures of earnings, 
and results. An important distinction within this literature is between studies that rely on cross-
sectional data and those that use longitudinal data because the direction of the causal relation 
between volunteering and income is open to debate (Qvist and Munk, 2018). 
Cross-sectional Studies
9Day and Devlin (1998) found that Canadian volunteers earn about seven percent more per 
year than non-volunteers, benefits shown in a subsequent analysis of the same data to be 
limited to men (Day and Devlin, 1997). On both occasions household rather than personal 
earnings was used as the dependent variable and both studies were for this reason confined to 
respondents who were the sole breadwinners in their household. This limitation was 
overcome in another Canadian cross-sectional study using personal earnings as the outcome 
variable: volunteers earned four per cent more than non-volunteers (Devlin, 2001). In a 
subsequent cross-sectional study of Canadian personal earnings male volunteers earned 
fourteen per cent more a year than males who were not volunteers but women did not benefit 
economically from their volunteer work (Devlin, 2003). 
Cross-sectional studies have also been conducted in a number of European countries with 
various methods being used to tackle the endogeneity issues attendant on the use of simultaneous 
measures of volunteering and earnings. An Austrian study found that volunteers earned 18.5 per 
cent more than non-volunteers (Hackl et al., 2007). A French study (limited to volunteers acting 
in a managerial capacity) found a positive effect of wages in the public sector but a negative 
effect in the private sector (Prouteau and Wolfe, 2006). In Italy, volunteers were found to earn 
3.3 percent more than non-volunteers (Bruno and Fiorello, 2016).
Longitudinal Studies 
Longitudinal data are best suited to investigating the influence of volunteering on earnings, 
but research using panel data shows inconsistent results. Author E’s (2015) analysis of PSID data 
showed that an extra year of volunteering increased women’s wages for part-time workers by 8.3 
per cent and for full-time workers by 2.4 per cent. Men were not included in the study. Statham 
and Rhoton (1985) and Paine et al. (2013) found that volunteers earn less money than non-
volunteers, but the first study was limited to women. Jorgenson (2013), Ruiter & De Graaf 
(2009), and Author D (2003) found no effect of volunteering, the last for women only.  Author B 
(2017) reports positive returns to volunteering, especially for men. A Danish study shows that 
the economic returns to volunteer work are largest during the early stages of working life (Qvist 
and Munk, 2018). Finally, a recent growth-curve analysis of Canadian data shows that 
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volunteering is significantly related to both initial income and growth in income over time but 
that men benefit more than women (Shantz et al., 2018). 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from this research. The first is that the estimates in 
longitudinal studies are smaller than those in cross-sectional studies, suggesting an upward bias 
in the latter due to a failure to take into account other variables that could account for an 
association between volunteering and earnings (Qvist and Munk, 2018). The second is that the 
relation between volunteering and earnings is often contingent on other factors such as gender, 
work experience and sector. However, none of these studies considers the possibility that the 
benefit of volunteering might differ by employment situation.
The current study looks to improve on previous research by (1) using panel data and lagged 
variables; (2) estimating fixed effects models to examine within-person changes; (3) measuring 
personal rather than household earnings; and (4) examining class moderation effects. 
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Data
The data for the study are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 
which began in 1991 with a representative sample of 5,500 households (10,300 individuals) 
residing in 250 different regions in England, southern Scotland and Wales. Each adult member 
of the original sample (aged 16 and over) was interviewed face-to-face and re-interviewed 
annually. Wave 1 sample members were followed into new households if they moved out of 
their original household. New members of any surveyed household were also interviewed. 
Supplemental samples from Scotland and Northern Ireland were added in 2000 (4,900 
households in total). Finally, the European Community Household Panel survey was merged 
from 1997 to 2001 (1,000 households). This means that the sample size increased over time. The 
peak was reached in 2001 with a total population of 18,867.  
The BHPS introduced questions about volunteering in 1996 as part of a module on leisure 
time pursuits. The module was repeated every other year. This study uses seven waves of 
information on volunteer work between 1996 and 2008. The estimation sample comprises 7,127 
men and 8,566 women, corresponding to 21,266 man-years and 28,186 woman-years. It is 
defined by the following exclusions: (1) only respondents between the ages of 15 and 65 in 
1996; once an individual reaches 65 years he or she is automatically dropped from the sample; 
(2) retirees, the long-term sick and disabled, and individuals who did not reply to the 
employment questions are excluded from the analysis; (3) those who reported very low earnings 
(less than £2.5 per hour in 2017 pounds) and were employed for less than the full year, 
indicating that their earnings reflected partial absence from the labour market rather than the rate 
of pay for their job; (4) respondents who reported very high work hours (more than seventy 
hours a week) and very low work hours (5 hours a week or less), the purpose of this exclusion 
being to focus on regular employment situationsi; (5) In the fixed effects models individuals who 
have not been interviewed for at least three waves are excluded from the sample. Altogether, the 
exclusions listed above remove only two per cent of the BHPS sample.
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We also exclude the self-employed from the analytical sample, for theoretical reasons. 
The moderation hypothesis proposes that the value of volunteer assets is affected by the nature of 
the employment relations typical of the occupational group. As others have noted, Goldthorpe’s 
scheme “reserves a particular class location for the self-employed” (Marshall et al. 2001:25). The 
self-employed (including proprietors) either have no employment relation because they are 
independent or they are employers. The moderation hypothesis, based on the employment 
relation of employees, does not therefore apply to them. It should also be noted that the self-
employed are notoriously unreliable income reporters: in the BHPS fifty percent of independents 
fail to provide information on their income (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004:22). 
Main Variables
Every other year, the BHPS asks respondents if they had engaged in volunteer work in the 
previous twelve months. Rather than use a variable indicating volunteer status (yes/no) in any 
given wave a variable is constructed that documents whether the respondent volunteered in the 
previous twelve months or had done so in any previous wave. In constructing this variable we 
assume that the influence on earnings of informal types of capital such as that provided by 
volunteering should be tested in the same way as capital theories are tested in the case of paid 
employment. According to these theories, individuals make lasting investments in their own set 
of productive skills by obtaining general experience in the labour market and specific experience 
with current employers (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2005: 60). The same should be true of the 
capital created by volunteering. For example, the social connections created during volunteer 
spells should have lasting value even if the volunteer work ceases. In the context of a panel study 
with several waves of data collection, the measurement should thus capture whether the 
respondent had volunteered at any time up to that point. For example, if a respondent 
volunteered in the 6th wave of the study his or her status as a volunteer remains positive in wave 
8 (regardless of whether he or she volunteered in wave 8) and does so until the end of the study. 
However, this is not a cumulative measure of volunteer experience because the BHPS provides 
no information on the respondent’s volunteer activity prior to entry into the survey and because 
the panel data are not pooled. 
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Volunteering – The wording of the volunteering question is: “We are interested in the things 
people do in their leisure time. I’m going to read out a list of some leisure activities. 
Please look at the card and tell me how frequently you do each one...unpaid voluntary work.” 
The options are:1) at least once a week, 2) at least once a month, 3) several times a year, 4) once 
a year or less and 5) never/almost never. Using this information a dummy variable for each 
respondent in each wave was constructed equal to 1 if the respondent reported volunteer work in 
the wave two years prior or had done so in any previous wave. Otherwise the variable was set to 
zero.
Personal Earnings – Logarithm of annual labour earnings (wages and salaries) constructed by 
inflating reported earnings to 2017 pounds. 
Moderating Variable
Social Class - Goldthorpe’s original schema identified eleven classes and this version is 
used in the BHPS. It refers to occupations not persons (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992:37). The 
top classes, “service class higher” and “service class lower”, are the “salariat” consisting of 
professional, higher technical, administrative, and managerial occupations. At the lower end of 
the scale are occupations that are manual skilled and unskilled, occupations that comprise the 
traditional “working class” (Evans, 1992: 224). At the intermediate level are occupations that are 
routine, non-manual and lower technical, manual and supervisory (Evans, 1992). Occupations in 
the intermediate class have some of the attributes of both polar classes (Evans, et al., 2000). As 
already noted, we exclude the self-employed from the analysis. Since interaction analyses with 
eleven classes would not be feasible only the three-fold version consisting of the salariat, the 
intermediate class, and the working class is used here. 
Control Variables
The following variables are used as controls because research shows that each is correlated 
with both volunteering and earnings.
 Age – dummy variables are used: 15-21, 22-28, 29-35, 36-42, 43-48, 49-56, 57-62, and 
63-65. Each dummy is set to 1 if the person is in the specific age category and 0 otherwise. 
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Education – The highest qualification achieved in any given year, captured by seven dummy 
variables: still in school with no qualification, no qualification or other qualification, secondary 
school (Apprenticeship, CSE grade 2, Commercial), high school (A or O levels), first degree 
(including teaching and nursing qualifications), or higher degree. Each dummy is set to 1 if the 
person achieved the specific education category and 0 otherwise. 
Potential Work Experience – Years of work experience is calculated as the difference 
between the current year and the first year that labour force status was recorded in the panel 
study. The variable is recoded so that, if the individual has spells of unemployment during the 
survey years, employment experience is not reset. Because we do not have information on work 
experience over the respondent’s entire adult life we use the term “potential work experience” 
for this variable.
Working full time – a dummy variable defined as 1 if the respondent reports working 30+ 
hours per week and 0 otherwise.
Sector – A set of dummy variables indicating the sector in which the individual currently 
works. These are: private firm/company (used as base category), civil servant/central 
government, local government/town hall, NHS or higher education, nationalized industry, and 
non-profit organization. Each dummy is set to 1 if the person works in a specific sector and 0 
otherwise.
Partnership – A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is married or living with 
someone as a couple, and equal to 0 if single, divorced, widowed, or never married.
Number of Children – A continuous variable recording the number of biological children 
living in the household.
Age of children – A set of dummy variables indicating the presence of at least 1 child between 
the ages of 0-2, 3-4, 5-11, and 12-18 in the household. The child is not necessarily the offspring 
of the respondent. Each dummy is set to 1 if there are children of that age in the household and 0 
otherwise.
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Union – A dummy variable equal to 1 if there a trade union in the workplace for those having 
the respondent’s occupation and 0 otherwise. 
Year of Survey – A dummy variable to indicate whether the year of survey is 2002. The dummy 
is equal to 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise. This control is necessary because a change in 
the response options on the showcard presented to respondents between wave 10 (2000) and 
wave 12 (2002) resulted in an increase in the proportion saying they volunteered “once a year or 
less” generating a substantial increase in the numbers reporting any volunteering at all (Staetsky 
and Mohan, 2011). 
The BHPS experienced attrition over the twelve years covered by this study (Uhrig, 2008). 
However, regression estimates suffer from attrition bias only if the number of years an individual 
contributes to the panel is related to the idiosyncratic error term it in the models. An analysis of 
the data, where the dependent variable took the value 0 if it was the respondent’s first year in the 
sample, 1 if it was the second year in the sample, and so on and where the covariates were the 
two main variables (annual labour earnings and volunteer experience) showed that the 
coefficients on earnings and volunteering were not statistically significant. It is unlikely that the 
results obtained from fixed effects models suffer from attrition bias.
Analytical Strategy
The study relies on fixed effects (FE) models to estimate within-person changes in earnings 
while controlling for between-person differences and fixed attributes of individuals such as 
gender. The FE estimate measures the average change in earnings for those who change their 
volunteer status over the sample period, compared to the average change in earnings for those 
who do not. This does not assume that all respondents were non-volunteers at the beginning of 
the sample period, simply that during the sample period some will change their volunteer status. 
The volunteer variable is lagged: that is, the variable indicates whether or not the respondent 
volunteered in the previous wave (i.e. two years before), while earnings are measured in the 
current wave. The benefits of this approach have already been outlined by Qvist and Munk 
(2018). Lagging volunteer experience by two years adds plausibility to the argument that 
earnings are the result rather than the cause of volunteering. A spell of volunteer work that 
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happened two years ago cannot have been affected by earnings in the current year. Finally, an 
interaction term between volunteering and each of the three occupational categories is computed 
to test the social class moderation hypothesis. 
The fixed effects model specifies the population relationship between the annual labour 
earnings of individual I at time t in a paid job, Yit, and the determinants of earnings as:
(1) Y𝑖𝑡 =  𝑉𝑖𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡
Where Vit-1 is a proxy for volunteering lagged for one year, Xit is a vector of individual 
characteristics, ui is an individual time-invariant effect, and it  is a time-varying random error 
component. The coefficient α measures the change in mean earnings due to a change in volunteer 
status. The coefficient vector β captures the effect on mean earnings of observed individual 
characteristics other than volunteer status. Xit contains observed individual characteristics that are 
related to human and social capital and ability signaling and also correlated with volunteer status 
(e.g., education). The main role of Xit is to correct for omitted variable bias in the estimate of  Yit, 
the increase in earnings due to a change from non-volunteer to volunteer status. The individual 
fixed-effect ui corrects for omitted variable bias due to factors, such as gender, parental education 
and personality that might be correlated with both income and volunteering and are fixed over 
time. it  represents unobserved human and social capital and ability signaling that can vary over 
time for each individual. 
We then estimate an equation which includes the interaction between volunteering and social 
class (salariat , intermediate  and manual ):𝑆𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑡
(2)  Y𝑖𝑡 =  𝑉𝑖𝑡 ‒ 1 + γ1𝑉𝑖𝑡 ‒ 1𝑆𝑖𝑡 + γ2𝑉𝑖𝑡 ‒ 1𝐼𝑖𝑡 + γ3𝑉𝑖𝑡 ‒ 1𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  u𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡
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Throughout the analyses we present two sets of findings, one for the whole sample where 
zero earnings is coded for those not participating in the labour market and one for employed 
respondents only. The reason for this distinction is that some of the research on the economic 
benefits of volunteering has focused on “employability”. Does volunteering make it easier to 
enter the labour market after a spell of unemployment or absence for some other reason (Paine et 
al., 2013)? If volunteering does improve one’s chances of getting a job after a spell of 
unemployment then including unemployed respondents in the analytical sample possibly 
confounds the effect of volunteering on earnings with the effect of moving from unemployment 
into employment (Qvist and Munk, 2017). On the other hand, focusing on employed individuals 
only risks delivering estimates affected by selection bias. A possible way to deal with this 
possibility without including unemployed individuals in the sample would be to use a Heckman 
Selection model but it would require the inclusion of at least one predictor (instrument) that 
should be added in the first stage and excluded in the second stage. The predictor must be 
exogenous, influence selection into the sample, but not related to the error term in the second 
stage. If the predictor is weak or endogenous then the estimates are inconsistent. In our case, 
finding an instrument with such characteristics proved fruitless. Consequently, presenting both 
sets of estimates seems the best way to show that the results for employed individuals only do 
not suffer from selection bias.
To test the moderation hypothesis interaction terms between the social class dummy variables 
and volunteer status are created. In the whole-sample analysis, which includes those not in the 
labor market, there are three social class dummy variables and the base category is not in the 
labor market. In this model F-tests are used to determine the statistical significance of any 
differences between the interaction coefficients. In the employed-only sample there are two 
social class dummy variables (manual workers is the base category) and therefore two interaction 
terms. 
Results
Table 1 uses pooled data to show zero order differences in the average logged annual labour 
earnings between volunteers and non-volunteers and between volunteers and non-volunteers 
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within the social classes and the control variables. The third column indicates if the difference is 
statistically significant. Recall that the volunteer variable contrasts those in the pooled data who 
had volunteered in any wave with non-volunteers. On average, volunteers earn only slightly 
more than non-volunteers, although the difference is significant. While the overall effect of 
volunteering on earnings might be modest, the next three rows in Table 1 show that it varies by 
social class. Salariat workers who volunteer earn significantly more than salariat workers who 
have not volunteered. The same cannot be said of the other two classes, in both of which 
volunteers earn less than non-volunteers. The weak overall main effect is therefore reflecting the 
conflicting influences of social class position. 
Table 1 about Here
The rest of the table shows the relation between the control variables and income, by 
volunteer status. Higher earnings are reported by males, full-time workers, and those who are: 
more highly educated, married, without school-age children, working in a unionized workplace, 
more experienced and employed by the central government or a nationalized industry. [Since 
potential work experience varies widely, the overall average is first calculated and individuals 
are classified according to whether they have more or less than the average years of potential 
work experience. The average earnings for both are then calculated.] Some of the differences 
shown support the thesis that the effect of volunteering is moderated by social class. For 
example, college graduates who volunteer earn more than college graduates who do not 
volunteer but among those with lower educational qualifications the opposite is true: volunteers 
earn less money than non-volunteers. 
Fixed effects estimates for logged income are shown in Table 2. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level. In models 1 and 3 (those without interaction terms) estimates 
show positive effects of volunteering in the whole and employed-only samples. The salariat 
report higher earnings in both the whole sample and the employed-only sample, with the latter 
indicating that intermediate workers earn slightly more than manual workers (who are the 
omitted category in this model). 
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Table 2 about Here
The main effects models lays the groundwork for the moderation analysis. On average, 
volunteers earn more money, as do members of the salariat and, to a lesser degree, workers in 
intermediate occupations. Do these factors interact to multiply these differences? Models 2 and 4 
in Table 2 report the results of the moderation analysis. In the whole sample model three 
interactions are reported. Compared to the non-employed respondents (i.e. those with zero 
earnings) all employees benefit from volunteering but the significant effect is confined to the 
salariat. [F-tests show that the differences between interactions involving the salariat and both of 
the other classes are significant but the difference in interactions between volunteering and the 
intermediate workers and volunteering and the manual workers is not significant.] In the 
employed-only sample, there are two interactions. Once again, salariat workers benefit more 
from volunteer work than the base category, manual workers. However, the interaction between 
volunteering and intermediate workers is negative and not significant, indicating that workers at 
the intermediate level do not benefit more from volunteering compared to manual workers, and 
might actually benefit less. In summary, both models (whole sample and employed-only sample) 
show that while there is no statistical difference in the effect of volunteering on earnings for 
manual and intermediate workers, salariat workers receive a larger benefit. 
While the analysis thus far reported uses logged income as the outcome variable, typical of 
research on this topic, it is informative to have results expressed also in terms of the currency of 
the country from which the data are drawn (cf. Ruiter and De Graff, 2009). A log linear 
transformation eases the interpretation of results but also compresses the distribution of the 
dependent variable. This is particularly true in this case as the right tail of the distribution for the 
salariat is much longer than that of the other two classes, making it possible for the effect of 
volunteering to be associated with extremely wealthy individuals who use volunteer work to 
make powerful connections. Table 3 shows the results for the same models where income is 
expressed in pounds sterling, updated to 2017. 
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Table 3 about Here
In the whole sample, having volunteered previously causes a £1,200.6 increase in annual 
earnings; in the employed-only sample the increase is slight larger (£1,606.1).  However, Table 3 
makes it clear that the effect of volunteering on earnings depends on employment situation: the 
joint effects of volunteering and being a manual or an intermediate worker bring an increase of 
£1,984.4 and £1,980.0, respectively while the joint effect of volunteering and being a salariat 
worker increases earnings by £4,125.0. The F-tests of 26.23 and 17.47 show that these 
differences in interaction estimates are significant. 
The results of testing the theory using pounds sterling with an employed-only sample are 
slightly different. In this case the interaction between having an intermediate occupation and 
volunteering is not significant. However, the effect of the interaction between being a salariat 
worker and having volunteered is positive and statistically significant (£2,074.2), confirming 
once again that the benefits of volunteering depend on employment situation.  
Discussion
There are good reasons to be curious about the possible economic benefits of doing 
volunteer work. The situation of the average worker in the labour market of advanced industrial 
societies is becoming increasingly precarious. Stripped of the assurances of the traditional 
contract between employer and employee, such as the expectation of promotion via internal 
labour markets, workers are urged to adopt self-development strategies to better their chances of 
finding a job, being promoted, or getting a raise (Chum et al., 2015). Engaging in volunteer work 
is often touted as one of these strategies (Smith, 2010). But the question remains: does 
volunteering actually pay off or is it more akin to employee moonlighting and thus a distraction 
that harms job performance (Rodell and Lynch, 2016)? 
This study confirms that volunteers earn more money than non-volunteers. It is still possible, 
of course, that there is nonrandom selection into volunteering and that high wage earners are 
more likely to volunteer or that low wage earners are situated in jobs that make it very difficult to 
engage in volunteer work. We attempt to reduce endogeneity bias by using longitudinal data, 
lagged variables and fixed effects models: current income cannot affect previous volunteering 
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and the fixed effects model  rules out the possibility of time-invariant factors affecting both 
volunteering and income. Moreover, fixed effects models provide within-group estimates and as 
such show the effect of a change in volunteering status on future income for the individual and 
not across individuals. We also control for a large set of variables aimed at reducing the 
possibility of time-variant factors affecting both volunteering and earnings.  This is the standard 
set by the best of the previous studies on this topic. As noted earlier, an even better approach 
would be to use an Instrumental Variables procedure, which would correct for the possibility that 
a change in earnings induces a change in volunteering status. Unfortunately, a plausible 
instrumental variable that affects a change in earnings only through a change in volunteering 
status is difficult to find in this context. 
The measurement of volunteering in the BHPS is rather limited. The survey question on 
volunteer activities is included in a long list of other leisure time pursuits. No follow up 
questions are asked to jog the memory. No prompts are given as to the kind of organizations for 
which a person might volunteer. It is therefore possible that volunteering is under-reported in the 
BHPS (Staetsky and Mohan 2011). Under- or over-reporting volunteer work does not occur at 
random and is likely to be influenced by matters such as social class, with working class people 
perhaps less likely to think of the help they provide to others as volunteer work. This would 
result in an over-estimate of the class differences in volunteering and its connection to the 
salariat and to people earning higher incomes.
It makes sense to expect that the benefits of volunteer work depend on how much time people 
spend on it. Because the BHPS asks respondents how often they volunteered in the past twelve 
months in ancillary analyses we constructed dummy variables to identify those who volunteered 
at least once a week, at least once a month, or at least several times a year.  The results were 
clear. First, there are no findings where the salariat interaction term is insignificant and the other 
interaction terms are significant. Second, the interaction coefficient for the salariat is always 
larger than for the other two classes. Third, the chances of the salariat interaction coefficient 
being significant increases as the definition of volunteer activity is relaxed to include less 
frequent activities. Fourth, when statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient for the 
interaction between volunteering and salariat workers increases as the definition of volunteering 
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is relaxed. The conclusion is that frequency of volunteering makes no difference to the 
moderating effects of social class.
One explanation for why more frequent volunteering has no effect on moderation is cell-
sizes. Only five percent of the BHPS respondents volunteered once a week, compared to twenty 
percent who volunteered less frequently during the year. Moreover, there is considerable 
movement between the various volunteering frequencies across waves which decreases even 
more the robustness of the results: only 37% of individuals who volunteered at the highest 
frequency did so in the subsequent wave. This is probably why it is common practice in the 
literature to use a dummy variable (Baert and Vujić 2018; Day and Devlin, 1998; Proteau and 
Wolff, 2006).  
Although we have focused on the employment situation as a moderator this is not the only 
possible reason why class might moderate the effect of volunteering. First, middle and upper 
class volunteers are more likely to select into or be selected for volunteer assignments, such as 
serving on a committee or governing board, that generate assets of more value in the labour 
market. As with paid jobs, volunteer tasks are distinguished according to their rank, as measured 
by criteria such as power, prestige, autonomy and agreeableness (Author A, 2008). For example, 
in the United Kingdom, professionals and managers who volunteer are less likely to engage in 
tasks such as food preparation and more likely to give presentations, offer advice, serve on a 
committee, or help with administration (Goddard, 1994). Middle and upper class volunteers also 
tend to avoid “hands on” volunteer work such as providing services directly to the needy, 
focusing instead on making these services possible for others to provide by organizing and 
supervising fund-raising efforts and soliciting government agencies, businesses, and 
philanthropic organizations for help. At the other end of the scale, craft workers and operatives 
are more likely to do the manual, routine and relatively unskilled work of maintenance, helping 
out at events, providing care or transportation, or coaching youth teams (Author C, 2007). 
Occupational status is also positively related to the number of tasks performed, especially in 
secular organizations, increasing the chances of generating capital (Author A, 2008). 
Second, class determines which kinds of organizations people volunteer for. It is possible that 
working class people are more disposed to volunteer for organizations that provide little or no 
useful skills, social contacts, or that send the wrong signals to employers (Qvist and Munk, 
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2017). They acquire less capital because of their choice of volunteer work. Day and Devlin 
(1998), for example, find that volunteering for a religious organization has a negative effect on 
earnings. This would imply that moderation has little or nothing to do with employment 
contracts and more to do with differences in the types of volunteer work in which employees 
engage. Unfortunately, the BHPS does not give respondents a list of organizations or causes for 
which they might have volunteered (political, religious, recreational) nor does it ask about 
specific tasks performed (e.g. coaching, tutoring, and secretarial). 
Finally, as noted in the literature review, the influence of volunteering on earnings is 
moderated by factors other than social class. Pursuing this topic further would entail the analysis 
of some interesting three-way interactions. We tested a gender moderation hypothesis using the 
BHPS panel data looking first at whether men or women benefitted more from volunteer work. 
The interaction coefficients were insignificant. Work experience has also been shown to be a 
moderator (Qvist and Munk 2018). We control for potential work experience but did not test for 
moderation because the BHPS measure is unsatisfactory. Qvist and Munk (2018) have data from 
Danish administrative registers covering the entire work history of respondents in the panel 
study. For its part, the BHPS defines work experience as the difference between the current year 
and the first year labour force status was recorded in the panel study. The average years of work 
experience in the Danish study is 14.26 and in the BHPS the median is three years.
We focus in this study on the contrast between the salariat and the working class. We exclude 
the self-employed because their inclusion upsets the logic of the comparison between different 
employees. As a robustness test, we explored the effects of including self-employed as a separate 
class category using logistic regression and manual workers as the base category. Self-employed 
workers have higher earnings than manual workers, whether logged or actual income, when the 
unemployed are included in the sample. They earn less money than manual workers, by either 
measure, when only employed make up the sample. There is a significant effect for the 
interaction with volunteering (negative) for both income measures but only in the whole sample 
(i.e. where the unemployed are included). As far as the interactions with other class groups are 
concerned, the inclusion of the self-employed in the model leaves the original results unchanged 
in the case of the whole sample and in the employed-only sample where income is measured in 
pounds sterling. [The original class interactions for logged income lose significance whether it be 
the whole sample or employed only.] 
24
As a second robustness check we experiment with reintroducing individuals who work 
extreme hours (les than 5 or over seventy hours per week). The original findings remain intact 
with one exception. The interaction terms for the employed-only sample where income is logged 
are no longer significant. Given that a very small fraction of the BHPS sample works extreme 
hours these results are not too concerning because they suggest that the moderation of the 
relation of volunteering to income by social class applies to the vast majority of the adult 
population. 
Conclusion 
In all likelihood volunteer work will become a more important resource for employees 
seeking a raise in pay or a better paying job than it is today not least because information about 
workers’ personal lives have become more transparent in the age of social media, opening a 
window for activities such as volunteer work to be observed and evaluated by coworkers and 
supervisors (Rodell & Lynch, 2016). With this in mind, there are other topics associated with the 
relation between volunteering and earnings that could be investigated further. First, there is 
evidence that volunteer work in secondary school and college positively affects the status and 
earnings of one’s first job, which in turn has beneficial consequences for wages and salaries later 
in life (Astin et al., 1998; Ballard et al., 2018). This suggests a narrower focus on the earlier 
stages of the life course might be revealing. Second, there is evidence that volunteer work helps 
people return to work more rapidly after an interruption (e.g. for raising children) or after a spell 
of unemployment (Konstam et al., 2015). In either case, volunteer work should result in higher 
earnings because it eases movement into the labour market. 
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Table 1: Average Income by Characteristics
Income if var=0 Income if var=1 Diff
(2) - (1)
(1) (2) (3)
Volunteering 9.841 9.930 0.088***
Salariat Workers 9.587 10.23 0.640***
Intermediate Workers 10.03 9.534 -0.495***
Manual Workers 9.938 9.658 -0.280***
Full time Work 9.028 10.05 1.026***
Married 9.824 9.903 0.079***
Children 9.873 9.869 -0.005
Child 0-2 9.864 9.972 0.108***
Child 3-4 9.870 9.896                       0.026  
Child 5-11 9.883 9.814 -0.069***
Child 12-18 9.880 9.809 -0.071***
Higher Degree 9.849 10.46 0.609***
First Degree 9.700 10.03 0.331***
High School 9.942 9.704 -0.239***
Second. School 9.887 9.619 -0.268***
Other Qualification 9.915 9.438 -.467***
Still in School 9.872    9.215 -0.657***
Non-white 9.926 9.870 -0.056*
Male 9.604 10.14 0.540***
Private Firm 9.890 9.862 -0.028**
Central Gov 9.863 10.04 0.175***
Local Gov 9.874 9.858 -0.016
NHS/High Edu 9.869 9.900 0.031*
Nat. Industry 9.870 10.08 0.214***
Non-profit 9.874 9.796 -0.079***
Other Industry 9.871 10.07 0.194**
Union 9.799 9.936 0.138***
Experience>Average 9.862 9.891 0.029***
The sample includes all respondents aged 15-65 between the years 1996 and 2008 and the data is pooled. Volunteering data 
are available every other year starting in 1996. Earnings are logarithms of constant 2017 pounds. Asterisks represent significance 
levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 on two-sided tests.
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Table 2: FE Estimates of Logged Income 
                 Whole Sample                               Employed Only
Interaction Interaction
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Other Qualification -0.032     
(0.065)
0.051       
(0.061)




R 0.980 0.980 0.245 0.246
NT 32,021 32,021 26,193 26,193
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Still in school is used as base category 
for education. Part-time labour is not reported as it is used as base category for the full-time dummy. Other regressors include 
working for a private firm, for the central government, for the local government, for NHS/higher education, nationalized industry, 
nonprofit organization, dummies for respondent’s age, age of respondent’s children, dummy for union at workplace, and the year 
of survey. Asterisks represent significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 on two-sided tests.
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Table 3: FE Estimates of Actual Income 
Whole Sample                Employed Only
Interaction Interaction





























































































































R 0.201 0.205 0.097 0.098
NT 32,021 32,021 26,193 26,193
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Still in school is used as base category 
for education. Part-time labour is not reported as it is used as base category for the full-time dummy. Other regressors include 
working for a private firm, for the central government, for the local government, for NHS/higher education, nationalized industry, 
nonprofit organization, dummies for respondent’s age, age of respondent’s children, dummy for union at workplace, and year of 
survey. Asterisks represent significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 on two-sided tests.
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iOnly a small fraction of the BHPS sample is affected by the restriction on extreme working hours. Another reason 
for this restriction is that the number of hours worked tends to be highly correlated with class: most of the 
employees working more than seventy  hours a week are members of the salariat class, while all of the sixteen 
person-year observations reporting working less than 5 hours a week are manual workers.
